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Ill THC SUPREME COURT OF TllF: STATE OF UTi\11 
SANDRA ST. PIERRE, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs- Case No. ~ f 70--Z'-c:;-
STANLEY W. EDMONDS, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This was an action brought by a former wife against 
her former husband, alleging (1) perpetration of a fraud 
upon the Court in the divorce action between the parties and 
(2) existence of conditions and circumstances sufficient to 
justify modification of property disposition in the divorce 
decree. 
DISPOSITION IN LOHER COURT 
The action was dismissed as prayed for in Defendant's 
first responsive pleading to Plaintiff's Amended Conplaint. 
RELIEF SOUGHT Oll APPEAL 
Appellant seeks this Court's determination that 
her Amended Complaint does indeed state a claim upon which 
relief may be 8ranted. 
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STAT81ENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff (Appellant) and Dcfondant (Respondl'nt) 
were forf'lerly husband and wife, divorced hy decree of the 
Fifth Judicial District Court in and for 1Jasington County, 
State of Utah in Civil No. 6588. Plaintiff (Appellant) 
originally Cof'lmenced the action for divorce, obtaining the 
Acknowledgment, Consent and Waiver of the Defendant to her 
Complaint. A Property Settlement Ap;reement was executed. 
The matter ua s heard by the Honorable J. Harlan Rurns on the 
11th day of April, lg78. Under the terms of the Complaint, 
agreed to by the Defendant and testified to hy the Plaintiff 
at the hearing, Plaintiff was to receive moderate al'lounts of 
property from the marital estate. The parties had been 
married seventeen years. 
On or about the 12th day of April, 19 7 8, De fondant 
(Respondent) insituted a campaign of harassment, threats and 
physical and verbal abuse against the Plaintiff (Appellant) 
culminating in his unilateral Withdrawal of Consent to 
Default filed the 21st day of April, 1978, filing of a 
Counterclail'l, and entry of an Acknowledp;ment, Consent and 
Haiver executed by Plaintiff (Appellant) under the most 
extreme duress. Hearing was held on Defendant's Counter-
claim on the 10th day of May, 1978, and Findings of Fact anrl 
Conclusions of Law were entered accordingly. Plaintiff was 
awarded nominal amounts of property from the rurital estate. 
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This action was commrncerl in the Fifth Judici;il 
District Court by the filing of a Complaint on the 11th day 
of January, 1980. The two causes of action of the complaint 
alleged (1) that the judgment should be set aside under Rule 
60(b), U.R.Civ.P., on the ground of fraud upon the Court 
caused by the presentation of the Acknowledgment, Consent 
and llaiver to the court as a voluntary instrument and on the 
ground of duress and (2) that Plaintiff was entitled to 
modification of the Decree of Divorce under Utah Code Ann. 
§30-3-5 (1953, as amended) on the ground that circumstances 
justified modification of the decree. 
Defendant, after having been served with a summons 
and complaint in this action, made a motion to dismiss. 
The court ordered dismissal of the complaint on 
the ground that claims of intrinsic fraud are more properly 
heard under Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5 (1953, as amended) and 
such actions would be more properly brought in the original 
divorce lawsuit, and further stating that the second cause 
of action, claiming relief under Utah code Ann. §30-3-5 
(1953, as amended) should be brought in the original divorce 
lawsuit. 
3 
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A RG lJ11F: fff 
POINT I. DISt!ISSAL IS NOT A DISC:RETIClrJAT\Y REt1CDY 
Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a 
cause of action must rest on a sound legal basis. The 
essence of the rnotion is the legal insufficiency of the 
allegations of the complaint. Disnissal signifies that even 
if all the averments of the complaint are assumed true, the 
complaint would fail to establish any legal right of recovery, 
POINT II. PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION DOES St" 
A CLAH1 UPON IJHICH RELIEF 11AY BE GRAllTED 
Plaintiff's first cause of action is based upon 
the facts therein alleged, and states a claim within the 
language of Rule 60(b), U.R.Civ.P., which allows courts the 
power to "entertain an independent action to relief a party 
from a judgl'Ent, order or proceeding or to set aside a 
judgment for fraud upon the court." 
The model of Rule 60(b) in the federal rules has 
been construed to allow hearing of actions such as those 
plead by Plaintiff. See [Anno., 19 ALR Fed. 761,] construc-
tion and application of provision of Rule 60(b) of Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure that rule does not limit power of 
Federal District Court to set aside judgr:icnt for "fraud upon 
the court". Traditionally, the courts have allowed collatera: 
4 
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il ttack upon a judg=nt or decree on the grouncls of intrinsic 
fraud only, is distinguished from extrinsic fraud. The 
authorities hold that under the rules of civil procedure, to 
a great extent, this distinction has been abolished. Hrip_ht, 
Federal Civil Procedures, §2860. 
Therefore, Plaintiff's first cause of acton noes 
state a claim which should be alloweci. 
POINT III. PLAINTIFF'S THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION STATES A 
CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED 
Plaintiff's second cause of action seeks to invoke 
the equitable powers of the court under Utah Code Ann. 
§30-3-5 (1953, as aT'\ended). That section provicies, in part: 
The court shall have continuinp_ jurisdiction to 
make such subsequent changes or neu orders with 
respect to the support and maintenance of the 
parties, the custody of the children and their 
suppor and maintenance, or the distribution of the 
property as shall be reasonable and necessary. 
While the general construction of this rule and 
general application has been in cases where subsequent 
changes in circumstances allow modification or make it 
reasonable and necessary, it is submitted that the intent of 
the statute is to allow the court plenary power over the 
persons and property of the parties to a divorce proceeding, 
not only at the time of the ciivorce, but following the 
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divorce to insure that the relative status of thl' parties i 
equitably maintained. 
Plaintiff submits that the recent cAse of Roye"~ 
Boyce, no. 16342, filed !larch 5, 1980, in this court, upholds 
Plaintiff's position that the court retains the equitable 
power to rnke substantial adjustments in the positions of 
the parties as justice may require. 
Plaintiff's second cause of action therefore 
states a claim upon which relief T'13Y and should be granted, 
and therefore the dismissal as to that cause should also be 
reversed. 
CONCLUSION BOTH OF PLAINLIFF'S CAUSES OF 
ACTIOtl STATE CLAIMS UPON HHICH 
RELIEF l1AY BE GR.All'.LED. 
lfuile Plaintiff might have chosen other methods in 
which to cast her pleadings, the fact that she cast them in 
an independent action, as a complaint, does not justify 
dismissal of those claims on that basis alone. To so hold 
would allow the court's discretionary power over the manner 
in ivhich individuals actions are carried forward in the 
court, when there is no substantial legal difference as to 
methods employed. 
6 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It is therefore suh~itted th~t the Order Dis~issinr 
the Co~plaint should be reversed. 
DATED this ~c::Laay of Aup,ust, l<J80. 
 
For David Nuffer 
Attorney for Sandra St. Pierre 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the CZ-cf.:, day of August, 
1980, I served two copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
on Mr. Phil lip L. Forerna ster, Attorney for Stanley \.!. Edmonds, 
by depositing said copies in the U.S. 11ail, postage prepaid, 
addressed to: 
Mr. Phillip L. Forernaster 
Attorney at Law 
494 East Tabernacle 
St. George, Utah 84770 /J 7 , ,/ ~··· ~ , /tJ,d IJ/V I vf ,l .& 
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